Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

Geneve Graehl Burt, Lorele Burt Neff, Karleen
Burt, Bonnie A. Burt, Shanna G. Burt, John G. Burt
v. Luella H. Burt, Emerson H. Burt, Mrs. Helen B.
Reed, Mrs. Dorothy B. Flowers, Lester C. Burt,
Milton F. Burt : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Gaylen S. Young; Attorney for Defendants and Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Burt v. Burt, No. 7313 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1087

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

731_3

IN THE

COURT

SUPREME
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
GEXEVE GRAEHL BURT, LO·RELE BURT XEFF, KARLE.EN
Bl~RT, BON.NIE A. BURT,
SH.AXX.A_ G. BURT, JOHN G.
BURT.
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
vs.
LUELLA H. BURT, Administratrix of the estate of John A.
Burt, deceased; L DELLA H.
BURT, an individual; EMERS.OK H. BURT, MRS. HELEN
B. REED, MRIS. DO·ROTHY B.
FLOWERS, LESTER C. BURT,
MILTON F. BURT,
Defenda-nts and .Ap·pella;nts.

~
~I

No. 7313

L~nAPPELLANTS

1

)«_,_}

t·~)R
~

7 .. ~~~-~
·

GAYLEN S. YO;UNG,
__ •• •• .Attorney for Defendants

OiiRK;SUPftEMt·couRt, Ul""

and Appellants

CENTURY PRINTING CO .. SALt-LAKE CITY
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
CASES CITED
Page

Anderson v. Cercone. 54 Utah 345, 180 P. 586 .............................. 39
Bancroft Code Pleading Vol. 1 P. 635 ............................................ 38
Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition P. 1778 ................................ 28
C. J. Vol. 18 P. 162 Sec. 42 .............................................................. 41
Cyc. Vol. 39 pp. 118 and 119 ............................................................. 39
Estey et al v. Haughian (Mont.) 113 P. 2d 325..........................40
Raleigh v. Wells 29 Utah 217, 81 P. 908 ...................................... 42
Thomas v. Farrell 82 Utah 537, 26 P. 2d 328 ............................36
Utah Code Annotated Sections 101-4-2, 101-4-5, 101-4-10 ....... ~30
104-26-2 --------------------------------------------------------------------·---... -............33
104-2-24, 104-2-30 ........................................................................ 36
Weelwright v. Roman 50 Utah 10, 165 P. 513 ........................... .40
STATEMENT .................................................................................... 3
Answer ................................................................................ 9 to 13
Complaint ---------------------------------------------·--·············---·--------· 4 to 9
Conclusions of Law____________________________________________________________ 21 to 22
Findings of Fact.............................................................. 18 to 21
Judgment and Decree ...................................................... 22 to 23
Pre-trial S tatern en t ... _________________ .. _________ .. _____ ...... _____ .... __ ... 13 to 16
STATE ME NT OF ERRORS ................................................... 23 to 26
ARGUMENT
THE G01URT ERRED IN OVER.RULING DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------26
THE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO THE SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION ------------·-···········-----------------------···········-···--·-·····-············-29
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I N D E X-(Continued)
Page

THERE IS A VA.RTANCE BETWEEN THE PLEADINGS AND THE PROOF IN THE FIRST CAUSE
O~F ACTION ···················-·-·································--····-··-····---------31
THERE IS A VARIANCE BETWEEN THE PLEADINGS AND THE PRO·OF IN THE SECOND
CA.USE OF ACTION ····-········-··········----·--·····----------------31 & 32
THE CONCLUSION (ib) ALLOWING PLAINTIFF THE
PROPERTY IN THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
IS N:O·T SUP·PORTED BY THE FINDINGS OR
PLEADINGS ---··················-···············--·-···-·-···········-···----------------32
THE CO·URT ERRED IN TRYING TO MAINTAIN
JURISDICTION OF SECOND CAUSE OF AGTION ________ 32
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKIN·G VALID DELIVERY
O·F DEED ONE O·F THE ISSUES AS WELL AS
INTENT TO VEST TITLE ···················--·-·----·······-···-------------33
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITT ING TESTIMONY
VARYING THE TER.MS OF A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT ................... _______ . __ ---- __________ ----·--··----·---- _____________________________ 34
1

THE COURT ERRE.D IN FAILING TO F·O·LLOW ITS
OWN RULING -----------------------···············-------------------------··-······35
THE CO~URT ER.R.ED IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS ON ALL OF THE MATERIAL ISSUES ----------------35
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW' AND JUDGMENT OF
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ARE CONTR.ARY TO
LAW . ______________ .. __________________________________________________ ---------· __ ----------··-37
THE GONC·LUSIO·NS O~F LAW AND JUDGMENT OF
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION ARE CONTRARY
TO LAW ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------42

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Suprema Court of the State of Utah
GENEVE GRAEHL BURT, LORELE BURT NEFF, KARL-EEN
BURT, BONNIE A. BURT,
SIL-L.~XA G. BURT, JOl-IN G.
BURT.
Pl-aintiff's and Respondents.
vs.
LUELLA H. BURT, Administratrix of the estate of John A.
Burt, deceased; LUE.LLA H.
BURT, an individual; EMERSON H. BURT, MRS. HELEN
B. REED, MRS. DOROTHY B.
FLOWERS, LESTER. C. BURT,
MILTON F. BURT,
Defendants and Appell(JJnts.

No. 7313

BRIEF OF APPELLAXTS
STATE~IENT

This action was filed by Geneve Graehl Burt, a
plural wife of John A. Burt, deceased, and her five
children as plaintiffis. The defendants are Luella H.
Burt, Administratrix of the estate of said John A. Burt,
deceased, Luella H. Burt as individual and her five children. Luella H. Burt is the widow and the legal and lawful wife of said deceased. The action is to set aside a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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deed and for a part of the estate of John A. Burt,
deceased.
The original CO~MPL·AINT consists of two causes
of aetion. About the time of the trial a third caus.e of action was filed but before the trial was over this was
abandoned. This left the first and second causes of
action ( Tr. 1 to 5) which as .stated in the original complaint except for the verification are as follows:
''FIRST CAUSE 0 F AC·TION
1

1. That the plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt,
is the: o"\vner in fee of a valuable piece of ground
in Salt Lake County, ~State of Utah, consisting
o:f approximately 2.55 acres and described as
follows:
Commencing 1223.7 feet East from Northwest Corner of Section 34, Township 1 South
R 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 315
feet more or le,ss to Salt Lake City Tract;
thence South 99 feet; thence South 14° 26' 30''
East 154.38 feet, thence West 44.3 feet 8outh
128.8 feet to creek; Westerly along the creek
to a point due South of beginning North 332
feet to beginning. 2.55 Acres.
2. That said plaintiff came into ownership
and possession of said traet of land on about the
15th day of August, 1939, and .since that time
has with her own hands and labor improved the
said land by planting fruit tre.e:s and gardens
thereon, and by removing stumps, dilapidated
buildings and by landscaping said ground and improving other buildings thereon and by building
new structures and permitting the building of
other structures thereon which has greatly enhanced and improved the value of said property.
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3. That on the 30th day of SeptembPr, lD~O,
plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, entt•red into what
she thought \Vas a. valid and legal marriage with
one John A. Burt, and since that time through
their relationship entered into a.s aforesaid, has
·given birth to and reared five children, the five
plaintiffs last named above.
4. That since the beginning of said relationship, said plaintiff and the said John A. Burt lived
together as man and wife; that the said John A.
Burt " . . as a man of strong character with definite
opinions and ideas who treated plaintiff and the
five children aforesaid with strictness and firmness demanding obedience in all things ; that said
John A. Burt was a man of unusual business
ability, and obtained the respect and confidence
of these plaintiffs in all matte-rs. pertaining to
business and business transactions.
5. That said plaintiff through most of her
life has been afflicted with a nervous ailment,
which at intervals has prostrated said plaintiff
-and which since the time of her said marriage to
the said John A. Burt, has at times ·caused her
to be dependent upon the said John A. Burt for
help and assistance in maintaining herself and
her home, and until the said children became old
enough to be of assistance to her, at the time of
the onset of said nervous spells as aforesaid, she
was entirely dependent upon said John A. Burt;
that during some of the· more severe spells of sickness aforesaid, plaintiff has been unconsciou.s
and .otherwise unable to give consideration to
business affairs or matters concerning herself or
her property or to act rationally in the conduct
of her affairs.
6. That on or about the 12th day of March~
1941, said John A. Burt caused said plaintiff to
sign a d0ed, in 'vhich ~he was the grantor and he
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\vas the grantee of the property described in paragraph No. 1 hereof ; that said plaintiff had therefore refused to sign such a deed but did s9 upou
this occasion :at the instance and request and
under the direction of the said John A. Burt,
who stated to said plaintiff that because of the
serious illness from which .she was then suffering
and because of the possibility that she would not
re-cover from it would be better that she sign a
deed conveying the property to him; that in reliance thereon· and under the direction and under
the influence and domination of the said John A.
Burt, said plaintiff did sign the deed aforesaid,
but did not appear before a notary public for the
purpos.e of having her signature thereon acknowledged and did surrender the said deed to said
John A. Burt.
7. At the time of signing .said deed arnd delivering it to the said John A. Burt, said plaintiff
did not receive any compensation or other consideration for said deed, but delivered it to (signed
the deed for) the said John A. Burt because
of her reliance upon him and because of the great
influence and domination which he exercised over
her; that thereafter said plaintiff saw nothing
more of said deed .and heard nothing more of it
until during the n1onth of l\1ay, 1948, when the
said deed was. found in the deposit box of the
said John A. Burt following his sudden death, by
defendant, Luella H. Burt, the administratrix of
his estate.
8. That the said Leulla H. Burt has taken
possession o:f said deed and has refused to deliver
it up to said plaintiff and has caused said deed
to be recorded in the office of the County R.ecorder. of Salt L·ake County, Utah; and has informed said plaintiff that she intends to list sa1c1
property as part of the assets of the estate of
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said J ohu A. Burt and to dPprivP said plaintiff
of it as her ho1ne .and to diYide it up among the
heirs at la""' including herself, of the said John
A. Burt, deceased.
9. That the five plaintiffs last named above
are the children of plaintif;f Geneve Graehl Burt
and John A. Burt, deceased, and are \Yilling and
agreeable that the deed to said property be returned to plaintiff, their mother; that the other
defendants refuse to surrender the .said deed;
that plaintiff is \Yithout a remedy except as
prayed herein.

SECOND CAUiS'E OF ACTION
10. F'laintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, alleges
as a second cause of action, that on the 30th day
of August, 1920, she and John A. Burt, deceased,
entered into what in good faith she thought was
a valid and legal marriage, and since that time
through their relationship entered into as aforesaid, she has given birth to and reared five children, the five plaintif:fs last named above.
11. That since that time and during the intervening twenty-eight years until the death of
the said John A. Burt on May 12, 1948, said
plaintiff and the said John A. Burt, worked and
planned tog·ether for the acquisition and development of an estate; that the said John A Burt
lived at the home of said plaintiff during a portion of the intervening time; that said plaintiff
cooked his meals, mended his clothes, and otherwise provided for his wants and needs, and discussed with him values of certain properties and
the advisability of .acquiring or selling of said
properties; that said plaintiff on occasion went
with said John A. Burt to view properties; that
said plaintiff lent encouragement to .said John A.
Burt on his plans and undertakings and assisted
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him in various ways in the accumulation of substantial properties.
12. That said John A. Burt died suddenly
in Salt Lake City, Utah, on M.ay 12, 1948, without leaving any will and without making any provision for distripution of the property and estate
accumulated as aforesaid by the said John A.
Burt.
13. That defendant, Luella H. Burt, has
been appointed as. administratrix for the estate·
of John A. Burt, deceas.ed, and has proceeded
with the administr.ation of said estate indicating
tha.t she will complete the administration of said
estate and divide it among the heirs at law (including herself) of the said John A. Burt, and
will make no provision for said plaintiff.
14. Said plaintiff estimates the value of
the estate of said John A.- Burt to be about
$60,000.00, and alleges that because of her contribution to s.aid estate and the assistance she has
rendered to the John A. Burt in the development
and accumulation of said estate, and that because
of her participation in the development of said
estate, she has an interest in said estate amounting to $20,000.00.
15. That she has no re·medy or means of securing for herself said interest except as prayed
for herein.
WHEREF01RE, plaintiffs. demand judgment
under the first cause of action:
1. That the deed delivered by said plaintiff to said John A. Burt be determined by the
court to be void.
2. Tha.t the defendants produce said deed
and deliver it up to be cancelled.
3. That de;fendants cause that the record of
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said deed and conYeyance be rPmoved from the
records at the County R-ec.order's office of Salt
Lake County, aforesaid.
Under the second cause of action :
1. That the estate of said John A. Burt,
deceased, be divided so as to provide for said
plaintiff a share amounting to the sum of
$20,000.00 or for such other share as in equity
and good conscienc~ this said plaintiff m.ay be
entitled to receive.
And for any and all other relief meet in the
premises and for the costs of this action.''
Defendants filed general demurrers (Tr. 7) to each
of said causes of action; and their ,AiN~SWER to the
complaint ( Tr. 8 to 12), except for the verification, is as
follows:
'' 1. Deny Paragraph 1 thereof.
2. In answer to_ Paragraph 2 thereof, admit
that the said plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, came
into possession of the property described in Paragraph 1 of said Complaint in and about August,
1939, through the permission of John A. Burt,
the deceas.ed. ·Admit that some improvements
have been made upon the said property, but allege
the fact to be that the said deceased, John A.
Burt, himself made said improvements, either
through the expenditure of his own funds or
through the ,,. . ork and labor of his children. The
defendants allege further that the plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, has paid no rental for the use
of said property.
3. In answer to Paragraph 3 thereof, these
defendants deny that said Geneve Graehl Burt
thought or had any grounds of believing that she
was entering into a legal and valid marriage with
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the said John A. Burt. On the contrary, the said
plaintiff, Geneve Gra.ehl Burt, knew at the time
of the purported marriage, that the .said John
A. Burt, deceased, already had a legal and lawful
wife living .and a family by her. Admit that the
said plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, has given
birth to five (.5) children by said John A. Burt,
deceased.
4. Deny, both generally and specifically,
each and every allegation contained in Paragraph
4, and .allege the fact to be that when said Geneve
Graehl Burt and said John A. Burt, deceased,
lived together that the said plaintiff, Geneve
Graehl Burt, and the said John A. Burt, deceased,
well knew that such relationship was contrary to
the laws of the State of Utah and was, and is
now, punishable by imprisonment in the State
Penitentiary.
5. In answer to F:aragraph 5 thereof, ad1nit
the deceased, John A. Burt, has given the said
Geneve Graehl Burt great assistance, financially
and otherwise, but on information and belief,
deny, both generally and specifically, each and
every other allegation contained in Paragraph 5.
6. In answer to Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9
thereof, the defendants. deny each and every allegation contained therein, except that may be admitted or qualified herein.
7. Defendants deny, both generally and .specifically, each and every other ·allegation contained in first said cause of action.
By way of .an -affirmative defense to the fi~st
cause of action, the answering defendants allege
that in 19~39 the deceased, John A. Burt, purchased with his own money the real property specifically described in f:aragraph 1 of Plaintiffs'
Complaint, and caused the same to be placed of
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record in the name of. GPnPYe Gra.ehl, who is
named as one of the plaintiffs. herein as Geneve
Braehl Burt. In 1941, realizing that upon the
death of said Geneve Graehl Burt said property
would go to her fiYe children, named as plaintiffs
herein, and that his other five children by his
legal and lawful \\'i.fe, Luella H. Burt, named as
defendants herein, would get no part of said
property, he requested said Geneve .Graehl
to deed said property to him, the said property
being equitablr O\Yned by him in any instance.
In order that all of the heirs of the deceased,
John A. Burt, might inherit said property, the
said Geneve Graehl did of her own free
_will and choice oil March 12, 1941, duly execute
·and deliver to said John A. Burt, deceased, said
deed of conveyance. That ever since said time,
said deed together \Yith the Abstract of Title to
said property have been in the possession of said
John A. Burt, and which were in his p~ossession
at the time of his demise. The Utah State rrax
Commission insists that said property be made
part and parcel of his estate for taxation purposes.
That in order to protect the interests of all
of the heirs-at-law of said John A. B·urt, deceased, it became the duty of Luella I-I. Burt,
the administratrix, to, and she did, file in the
County Recorder's Office of Salt Lake· County,
State of Utah, said deed.
These defendants allege further that after
the said Geneve Graehl executed and delivered
to said John A. Burt, deceased, the said deed,
the said John A. Burt made, at his own expense
and with the work and labor of his ovvn children,
considerable· im-provements and built a building
on said lot.
That the plaintiffs are barred from proceedSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing with this action on the grounds that they are
guilty of laches. That if said John A. Burt, deceased, used any undue influence or domination
of Geneve Gra.ehl Burt to have her execute and
deliver to him the said deed, the Geneve Graehl
Burt should have commenced proceedings imme. .
diately following the same, rather than to wait
more than seven ye.ars following such execution
and delivery, and until after the death of the said
Grantee.
The said plaintiffs .a:re barred from any action in this. matter by reason of Section 104-2-24
of the Utah Code Annotated, 19·43.
That the said plaintiffs are barred from any
legal action in this rna tter py reason of Section
104-2-30 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
IN ANIS WER TO' PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
CAUS·E O·F ACTION, the defendants admit,
deny and allege as follows :
1

1. Deny Paragraph 10 thereof, except that
said defendants admit that the said Geneve
Graehl Burt has given birth to five ( 5) childrrn
by said John A. Burt, deceased.
2. Deny each and every allegation contained
in Paragraph 11 thereof.
3. In answer to Paragraph 12 thereof, the
defendants admit that the said John A. Burt died
on or about May 12, 1948, without leaving a will,
and deny each and every other allegation contained in Paragraph 12, but allege the fact to be
that the said five ( 5) children of the. plaintiff,
Geneve Graehl Burt, under the laws of the State
of Utah will inherity one-third of the entire estate
of said John A. Burt in their own right. Said
estate, after paying all debts, will amount to upproximately $60,000.00.
·
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4. In answer to Fara.gr.a.ph 13 thereof, admit the same and allege the ·further fact to be
that under the law, the p•laintiffs, excepting the
plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, will receive onethird of the entire estate of the said John A.
Burt, deceased, as aforesaid.
5. In ans,ver to Paragraph 14 thereof, the
defendants admit that the value of said estate
is about $60,000.00, but deny each and every other
allegation contained in Paragraph 14.
6. Deny, both generally and specifically,
each and every other allegation contained in Second Cause of Action.
7. That the plaintiffs are barred from proceeding with this action on the grounds that they
are guilty of laches That the plaintiffs are barred
from any action in this matter by reason of the
Statute of Limitations under Sections 104-2-23
and 104-2-30 of the- Utah Code Annotated, 1943.

"\VHEREFORE, the answering -9efendants
pray that_.the plaintiffs' Complaint he dismissed
with costs assessed .against the plaintiffs, and for
SUCh:-Other relief that the C·ourt may deem proper
in the premises.'' The Court held a -p!re~trial on December 3, 1948, and
after the case was called .for trial on December 8, 1948,
the Court handed to co~sel a written pap·er called PRETRIAL ,STAT·EMENT the whole of which is as follows:
''rrhe above-entitledmatter came on for pretrial hearing, pursuant to the order of the Court,
at 3 :00 o'.clock P. l\I. on the 3r.d day of December,
1948, before fionorable J. Allan Crockett, one
of the judges uf the above-named court. lVIerrill
C. Faux, Esq., appeared on behalf of the plainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tiffs, and Gaylen S. Young, Esq., appeared on behalf of the defendants.
John A. Burt, herein called the deceas·ed, and
Geneve Graehl Burt, herein called plaintiff, went
through a purported marriage ceremony about
September 30, 1920, and thereafter cohabited together and lived more or less continuously together, at least until about 1934. Born to them
were the five children who have joined their
mother as co-plaintiffs in her interest in this
action.
During the time above mentioned, said John
A. Burt had a leg.al wife and another family, consisting of the above-named defendants with whom
he also lived more or less continuously during
the same period of time, and up until his death
on May 12, 1948.
During the time aforementioned, and until
his death, .said deceased exerted efforts to provide for plaintiffs., and maintained his interest
in them as his family. About August 15, 1939,
there was selected the property described in Paragraph 1 of the complaint as a home for plaintiff
and her children; they moved thereon, whe-re they
have since resided. The deed to such property
showed Geneve Graehl as grantee and was duly
recorded. Plaintiff did not individually invest
any of her separate money in said property.
March 12, 1941, the deed, Exhibit A, naming
de-ceased a.s grantee, \Vas signed by plaintiff (and
surrendered to deceased). There was no actual
payment of money, or transfer of other physical
thing of value in connection with the signing of
said deed. The deed was left in a safety deposit
box, which deceased had exclusively in his name,
where it was found at the time of his death. The
abstract to s-aid property was in the posse·ssion of
said deceased.
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Said deed wa.s recorded at the request of
Gaylen S. Young, attorney for the defendant administratrix, on July 29, 1948:.
Plaintiff, during aJl times material to this
cause, has been suffering from a nervous ailment
which, at times, has caused her to be confined to
her bed.
The estate of said deceased is being probated
in this court and appraised by the County Appraisers in the sum of approximately $89,000,
which includes an item of $15,000 for the property
in controversy hereinbefore referred to, and described in Paragraph 1 of the complaint.
If plaintiff is entitled to recover on her third
cause of action, it is .agreed that $200 per year
for each child is a reasonable charge for care
and attention given by plaintiff to her children,
the other plaintiffs.
Disputed issues :
1. Defendant contends that, although there
was no formal separation between plaintiff and
· deceased, they ceased cohabitation more than ten
years ago.
2. Did plaintiff contact and continue the
marriage relationship in good faith, believing it
to be a valid marriage~
3. Was there a valid delivery of the deed,
Exhibit A~
4. Was there a valid consideration for the
deed, Exhibit A?
5. Was the delivery of Exhibit A for a special purpose only and "\\ ithout the necessary intent to vest title in the grantee~
There is some dispute about the acknowledgement of Exhibit A, but the parties agree that the
7
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failure, if there was such failure, to have it properly acknowledged would not in and of itself invalidate the deed.
J. ALLAN CRO·C'KETT
Judge''
At some time the words in parenthesis ''and surrendered to deceased'' were crossed out of the file copy
(Tr. 27 and 28).
At the trial one Edwin E. Johnson testified that
about 1941 he tried to buy a strip of the land in que·s-tion from the deceased, John ,A. Burt, but that he would
not sell it because ''he p~roposed to have a home there
for his wife and children.'' ( Tr. 57 and 58).
1

The deceased, John A. Burt, frequented the place
two or three times a week ( Tr. 60). He had his legal
and lawful wife and family living in another part of
the city. John A. Burt hired men to work on the place
(Tr. 69). He paid them. (Tr. 73). Geneve Graehl did
not stand any of the expense. John A. Burt took charge
of the place. ( Tr. 73). The deceased's brother did a lot
of work on the house. (Tr. 75). John A. Burt "worked
on the place, irrigated.'' ( Tr. 90). Geneve Graehl Burt
got permission of the deceas.ed to build a garage-like
house on the property ( Tr. 113). John A. Burt bought
the place with his own money and had the title taken in
the name of Geneve Graehl. Said plaintiff used that
name as well as Davis and Geneve Graehl Burt. (Tr. 120
and 123).
When the supposed marriage took place the plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt, says she knew they had to
have a license and a m.arTiage certificate which they did
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not get. \Y.ht>n questioned as to \YhPther or not about
1930 when the eivil authorities "'ere after the polygamists she and the deceased ag-reed from then on not to
live together as man and wife she said ''no. '' When
asked a further question 'vhether or not the deceased
and she would thereafter comply with the civil law she
answered ''no, w·e did not; it never bothered us;'' and
that they were "firm in their convictions," and conscience is what guided them. She knew at the time of
the supposed marriage that the deceased John A. Burt
had a legal wife and family living and that his said
legal wife, Luella H. Burt survived him.

There was no understanding that plaintiff Geneve
Graehl Burt should not part with title at the time of
execution of the deed. Xo understanding that way at all.
(Tr. 107). She has lived there since Mr. Burt purchased
it and has not paid any rent. ( Tr. 123).
~Ir.

Burt brought up the question of her executing
the deed several times. She refused at first but later she
consented to sign it. She then signed the deed conveying
the property to him. She surrendered and delivered the
deed to John A. Burt, the deceased. (Tr. 3).
After both parties had rested and over the objeetion of defendants the court on motion of the plaintiffs'
attorney pP1·n1ith)d plaintiffs to amend the complaint by
~triking out the words shown in italics in paragraph8
6 and 7 .and by adding the four words shown in parentlH)sis is paragraph 7. Also during the trial an amendn1ent was made adding. the water right clause following
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the description of the real estate as found in finding
No.3.
Leaving out the titles and the preliminary statements the :findings of fact and conclusions of law and
decree are ( Tr. 29 to 34) as follows:

"FINDINGS O·F FACT
FIRST Q:AUIS'E 0 F' kCTION:
1

1. Geneve Graehl Burt, hereinafter called
plaintiff, .and John A. Burt, hereinafter called the
deceased, on or about s.eptember 30, 1920, went
through .a proported marriage ceremony and
thereafter cohabited together and lived more or
less continuously together up until the death of
the deceased on May 12, 19'48. Born to them during that time were the five children 'vho have
joined their mother as co-plaintiffs, in her interest in this action .and during that time said deceased exerted efforts to provide for plaintiffs
and maintained his interest in them as his family.
2. Also during the time above mentioned,
said John A. Burt had a legal wife and another
family consisting of the above named de\fendants
with whom he also has lived more or less continuously during the same period of time and up
until his death. That plaintiff, at the time of her
purported marriage to deceased, knew of his
other wife and family, but becaus.e of religious
convictions believed her assoeia tion with deceased
to be proper.
3. . On about August 15, 1939, plaintiff and
deceased selected as a home for plaintiff and her
children the property known as No. 2150 Evergreen Street in Salt Lake County, Utah, more
particulartly described as follows:
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Commencing 1223.7 feet East from Northwest Corner of Section 34, To:wnship 1 South
R 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence East 315
feet more or less to Salt Lake City Tract;
thence South 99 feet; thence s.outh. 14 ° 26' 30"
East 154.38 feet, thence West 44.3 feet South
12·8.8 feet to creek; Westerly along the creek
to a point due South of beginning North 332
feet to beginning. 2.55 Acres.
Together with all water and water rights
appertaining to said lands, including 1500 gallons per day from the Mill Creek ; also 3I 4/5
hours. of water every 7 days out of the Keller
ditch.
That plaintiffs soon thereafter moved upon
said property where they have since resided. r~rhe
deed to such property showed Ge_neve Graehl as
grantee and was duly recorded. Plaintiff did not
individually invest any of her separate money in
said property.
4. During the time plaintiff has lived on
said property, she with her own hands and labor
and by directing others, has improved said land
by planting fruit trees and gardens thereon, hy
removing stump·s, dilapidated buildings and by
landscaping said ground and improving other
buildings and by building new structures and permitting the building of other structures thereon
and has greatly enhanced and increased the value
of said property.
5. That during .all times material to this
case, plaintiff has suffered from a nervous ailment, which at times has rendered her unable
to attend the affairs of her home and caused her
to he confined to her bed.
6.

That on or about the 12th day of March,
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1941, the deed admitted in evidence as ''Exhibit
A'' in said case naming deceas.ed as grantee
and containing the description of property as set
out in paragraph 3 hereof was signed hy plaintiff.
There was no actual pay!Jlent of money or trans£er of other physical thing of value in connec-.
tion with the· signing of said deed. The deed was
left in a safety deposit box, which deceased had
exclusively in his name, where it was found at
the time of his death. The abstract of said property was in possession of said deceased. Sai~
deed was recorded in the office of the County
Recorder Olf Salt Lake County, State of Utah, at
the request of Attorney Ga.ylen S. Young, attorney for defendant, administratrix, on July
29, 1948:, in book No. 625, page 115 ..

·7. That plaintiff did not intend to part with
title to said property when she signed the deed
aforesaid, but intended it to operate only in the
event of and at the time of her death, and that
she did not deliver said deed to deceased. That
the estate of said deceased is being probated in
this court, and has been appraised by the County
appraisers in the sum of app·roximately $89,000.00
which includes an item of $15,000.00 for the property described in parara.ph 3 hereof.
,SEC:OIND

CAU~SE

O·F ACTI0 N:
1

8. As to the second cause of action, the
court finds in accordance with and incorporates
herein the findings set forth in para.raphs 1, 2,
3, and 4 hereof.
9. That during the· p·eriod between the time
that plainti££ .and deceased went through the proported marriage ceremony on September 20,
1920, and the death of the deceas.ed on May 12,
1948', said plain tiff and deceased worked · and
planned together for the acquisition and develop-
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ment of nn estate; that said John A. Burt lived
at the ho1ne of said plaintiff during a portion of
said period. That plaintiff discussed with deceased, values of certain real estate properties
and the adYiseability of acquiring or selling said
properties; that said plaintiff on occasions went
with said deceased to view real estate properties,
and that said plaintiff lent encouragement to said
deceased on his plans and undertakings, and in
doing all of the :foregoing assisted him in the accumulation of the substantial properties inventoried in the proceedings to prohate his estate
now pending in this court.
10. That when deceased died as aforesaid,
he left no will and made no provision for distribution of the property in the estate accumulated
by him of the value of $89,000.00 as. appraised
by the County appraisers aforesaid.
11. As to the third cause of action, plaintiffs abandoned it during the course of said trial
and the court according·ly with respect to said
cause of action, makes no findings of fact.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the
court now makes and enters its
CONCLUSIO·NS OF LAW
That the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
and decree as follo,vs:
As to the FIRST CAU:S·E O·F. ACTIO,N:
(a) That the deed referred to in paragraph
3 of the Findings of Fact herein should be determined to be void, and the same should be
cancelled.
(b) That the plaintiff should be allowed
the property described in said paragraph 3 of
the foregoing Findings of Fact.
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As to the SECOND CAUSE O·F ACTIO-N:
(c) That in the event, through appeal or
review of the judgment he-rein, the conclusions
of the court as to the first cause of action should
be held to be error, and that on that account the
judgment based thereon he reversed, then and
in tha.t event plaintiff should be entitled to an
equitable distribution of the property of said deceased, acquired during the time this plaintiff
and deceased were cohabiting as man and wife
and inventoried in the proceedings to probate his
estate now pending in this court.
Dated this 3rd day of January, 1949.
J. ALLAN CRO~CKETT
Judge"
"JUDGMENT AND DECRE·E
NO!W TI-IEREF·O·RE, IT IS HEREBY ORD·ERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That the deed referred to and described
in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact herein,
and recorded on July 28, 19·48, in the office of
the County Recorder of Salt Lake County in
Book No. 625, page 115, be and is hereby held to
be void and is hereby cancelled.
2. That plaintiff Geneve Graehl Burt, is
hereby allowed the property home and grounds
known as No. 2150 Evergreen Street in Salt Lake
County, Utah, and more particularly described
as follows:
(Same description as in finding No. 3).
It is the fqrther judgment of this court that
should plaintiff by appeal or review of this judgment be deprived of the ownership of the property described in the foregoing paragraph hereof,
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then and in that PYent, said plaintiff should be
granted and allowed ·an equitable interest in the
estate of deceased, John A. Burt, the amount of
such interest to be determinPd by further proceedings in this court.
Dated this 3rd day of January, 1949.
J. ALLAN CROCKETT
Judge''

1. The Court erred in overruling defendants' general demurrer to plaintiffs' first cause· of action.
2. The Court erred in overruling defendants' general demurrer to plaintiffs' second cause of action.
3. The Court erred in rendering judgment for
plaintiffs on the first cause as amended when the same
does not state facts suf;ficient to constitute a cause of
action .
4. There is a variance between the pleadings and
the proof in first cause of action.
5. There is a variance between the pleadings and
the proof in second cause of action.
6. That the conclusion (b) of first cause of action
is not supported by the findings or the pleadings.
7. That the Court erred in trying to maintain jurisdiction of second cause of action, after rendering a
decision thereon, until after first cause of action should
be determined in the Supreme Court.
8.

The Court errPcl in making one of the issues in
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dispute at the beginning of the trial the valid delivery
of the deed. ( Tr. 28:).
9. The Court erred in making one of the issues in
dispute at the beginning of the trial the delivery of the
deed ,for a special purpose only and without the necessary intent to veRt title in grantee. (Tr. 28).
10. The· Court erred in permitting Geneve Graehl
Burt over the objection of defendants to testify what
was in her own mind as is shown in the following testimony found on pp. 106 and 107 of transcript.

''By Mr. Faux:

Q. Mrs. Burt. I hand you what has been marked.
here as Exhibit B, (the deed) and ask you. if that is your
signature1
A.

Yes, think it is mine.

State whether or not when you signed that, you
had the intention of parting with title to that property
during your life time 1
Q.

Mr. Young: Just a minute, I object to this on the
ground it is attempting to vary the terms of a -vvritten
instrument.
Mr. Faux: I resist that; it goes to the very crux
of. this la~w suit.
The Court: Just missed a word right in the beginning; ''In connection with the signing of that deed, did
you intend''-'was the general question, did you ever
intendMr. Faux: No, I have forgotten.
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The Court: "\Vny I understand it you asked it generally, -and to that question, I would sustain an objection.
Let's get back-she said that is her signature; with
reference to that signature, you asked her what?

Q.

(By nir. Faux) Whether or not you intended to
part with the title of the property covered by that deed 1

A.

There was no understanding-

l\Ir. Young:

Just a minute.

The Court:

She may ans\ver.

Mr. Young:

nlay we have an

objection~

The Court : Yes.
Mr. Young: We want to object in caseThe Court: That is- all right; you may have your
objection; she may answer.

Q. State \Yhether or not you intended, during your
lifetime, to part with the title to that property.
A. Absolutely no; there wasn't any understanding
that way at -all."
11. The Court erred when it failed to follow its ruling in the following instance:
Mr. Faux asked the said Mrs. Geneve Graehl Burt
( Tr. 81) : Did you finally consent to sign a deed to take
care of things in case of your death~
A. ----- ''so he told me that it would be wise for
me to sign the deed, in case I should die'' etc.
Mr. Young objected and further on -at the bottom
of p. 125 moved that state-ments he made to her be
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stricken on the grounds it was all hearsay and contrary
to the dead ma.n''s statute.
The Court after some discussion said it ''will disregard the evidence that is incompetent insofar as I
am able to; is that satisfactory, Mr. Young."
Mr. Young: That's all right.
Finding No. 7 indicates the Court disregarded its
promise in this respect.
12. The Court erred in failing to make findings,
conclusions and judgment as to whether or not the plaintiffs are guilty of laches and barred by the statute of
limitations as presented in the issues by the last three
unnumbered paragraphs of defendants' affirmative defense to the .first cause of action.
13. That the Court erred in failing to make findings, conclusions and judgment as to whether or not
the plaintiffs are guilty of laches and barred by the
statute of limitations a.s presented in the issues in paragraph 7 of defendants' . ans.wer to plaintiffs' second
cause of action.
14. That the conclusions of law and judgment concerning the first cause of action are contrary to law,
15. That the conclusions of law and judgment concerning the second cause of action are contrary to law.

ARGUMENT
1. THE COURT ERRED IN OVE·RRULING DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER- TO· THE FIRST CAUSE
O·F ACTIOIN:
This cause alleged at the time of demurrer:
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(a) The ownership by Geneve Graehl Burt of
the property in question.
(b) In 1920 she entered into what she thought
was a Yalid and legal marriage with deceased, John
~\. Burt.
(c) That said Burt 'Yas a man of strong character and demanded obedience in all things.
(d) That he had unusual business ability and
obtained plaintiffs' respect and confidence in business rna tters.
(e) That plaintiff was afflicted with a
vous ailment.

ner~

(f) That said plaintiff had refused to sign the
deed as requested by John A. Burt before but on
March 12, 1941, at his instance and reque·st and
under his direction she signed the deed and surrendered it to him. At the time he stated to her
"that because of the serious illness from which she
was suffering and because of the. possibility that
she would not recover it would be better that she
sign a deed conveying the property him. ''
(g) That in reliance thereon under his influence and domination she did sign and surrender the
deed to said John A. Burt.
The complaint sounds in .fraud but it does not contain the necessary alle·gation to support a fraud action.
It is enough to say that in no place does it contain any
alleg~ation that Mr. Burt made any representations to
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the grantor that were false·, nor that she believed such
represen ta.tions.
The complaint would also seem to indicate that a
cause of action might have been intended in the nature
of unduH influence. In that instance there would certainly have to be pleaded facts to show incapacity or weakness of mind of the grantor. A person might be ever
so weak physically but a giant mentally. ''Influence obtained by persuasion and argument, or gainoo by kindness and affeetion, is. not pfrohibited, where no imposition of fraud is practiced, and where the person ~s will
is not overcome . . . . . . ''Undue influence is a species
of fraud" p. 1778 Black's L:aw Dictionary Third Edition
undeT ''Undue influence.',.
The fact that ~ ohn A. Burt was a strong character
is not suf:ficient. The grantor could be a woman with
much stronger will than the grantee. It appears. from
the complaint that she deeded that property back to
him because she wanted him to have it. She wanted to
be fair about it. The property she knew belonged to Mr.
Burt. He paid for it. She did not feel that the property
in case of her death should all go to her children when
Mr.· Burt1 also had five children of Luella H. Burt, his
legal and lawful wife. It was not agreed that Mr. Burt
should have control of the property only in case of the
grantor's death. He thought it was better and wise that
the propeTty be in his name. She thought with him that
it would be better also. She continued in that thinking
for seven years.. It was not until after she found out that
he died that she changed her mind. She is not willing
now that the children of the legal wife share in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

property. She in effect tells this court that she made a
n1istake and that it was not better; that she did not act
wisely when .she deeded and conve·yed the property to
him. That does not make a legal or equitable cause of
action.
The defendants do not belieYe the first rau.se states
facts ·sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The Court
should have sustained the ~·eneral demurrer.
~

2. THE CO,URT ERRED IN O·VE·R-RULING DEFEND,ANTS' D·EMURR.ER. TO· THE S E C 0 N D
CAUSE O·F AC'TIO~N.

We obtain from this cause:
(a) That said John A. Burt, the deceased, left
no provision for Geneve Graehl Burt by will and
that she will not get any part of his estate when she
thought she was legally married to him.
(b) That she lived with him years and bore
five children by him; that she cooked his meals,
mended his clothes, etc.; that she discussed with him
his business affairs and lent him encouragement
and assisted him in various ways in accumulation
of snbs.tan tial properties.
Where is the cause of ae;tion in this case~ Suppose
she did cook s.ome of his meals. She does not say that
she was or was not well p·aid for those meals. She alleges no investment of time or money in his properties. Nor does she state that he ever took her in as a
partner. Many people assist others in various ways to
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agement to its customers which may assist those customers very materially in accumulating properties. That
does not make the bank a joint owner or give them any
interest in the properties. If she had no interest at
the time of his death she has no interest now.
At the time of his deHth the title of all his real
and personal property vested in his heirs subject to
administration of the estate-D. C. A. 101-4-2. Section
101-4-5 U. c. A. provides that the property must be distributed in the following manner: - - - - if the deceased
leaves a surviving wife, and more than one child - - . . - - one third to the surviving - - - - wife and the remainder in equal shares to his children. Section 104-4-10
provides that_ illegitimate children inherit · - - - - the
same as if born in lawful wedlock.
The prayer for the second cause asks that the
estate of John A. Burt provide a share of $20,000.00
for her-about one third oif the estate. The complaint
does not set out any inter~st she had in the property
at the time of his death. The Court has no jurisdiction
to take away property belonging to and vested in the
legal heirs. and give it to one who is not a legal heirand this too merely because plaintiffs 'think that deceased should have made a will.
We be~lieve that the second ea use· does not state
facts, sufficient to constitute ·a cause of action and that
the court should have sustained the general demurrer.
As an argument in support of error number 3 defendants adopt the argument in support of error number. 1. It can be noted that after the amendments to
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the first cause of action ''rere made none of the facts
as alleged were changed or modified. The amendments
were clearly made to try to avoid the admission of delivery of the deed to the deceased, John A. Burt, but
upon even a casual perus.al one can see there is still
a de[inite admission that the deed was surrendered to
said deceased in the last ten words of paragraph 6.
(Tr. 3).
Error

~~ zunber

4:

IS~

A vTARIANCE BET·WEEN THE
PLEADINGS AND THE PROOF IN FIB;ST UAUSE
O·F ACTIO(N-.
THER.E

A variance is app,arent between the pleadings and
the proof. The complaint and answer raises the issues a.s
to whether or not the deceased, John A. Burt, by gaining the confidence of the said plaintiff, Geneve Graehl
Burt, using hi-s so called ''strong character'' forced her
to sign and surrender to him the deed and whether or
not she executed it only because of his great influence
and domination over her. Not a scintilla of evidence was
introduced to show that he used force or his strong
character and domination over her to get her to sign
the deed. On the other hand said plaintiff stated, as is
reflected in finding number 7, that she signed the deed
and intended ''it to- operate only in the event of and at
the time of her death.'' No finding was made and no
proof was given that the deed 'vas not executed of her
own free will and choice.
Error Number 5:

THER.E IS A VARIANCE BETWEEN THE
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PLEADING AND PR.OOF IN TI-IE
OIF .ACTI0 N.

SE~CO·ND

CAUSE

1

The center point, or the foundation, upon which
the whole· second cause of action was, built was the
claim, a.s set out in par.a.graph 10 of the complaint,
that said Geneve Graehl Burt "entered into what in
good faith she thought was a valid and legal marriage."
ThH proof shows quite to the contrary that she knew
the marriage was invalid and illegal. (Tr. 121 and 122).
Error Number 6:

THAT C,O,NCLUSIO:N (b) ALLOWING PLAINTIFF THE PROPERTY IN FIRST c·AUSE O~F ACTION IS NO'T SUFPO,RTED BY THE FINDINGS
OIR PLEADINGS.
There is no finding and no pleading in the first
cause to the effect plaintiffs, or any of them, should
be allowed the property in question. The action was
one to void ~nd cancel a deed.

Error Number 7:

THE COURT ERRED IN TRYING TO· MAINTAtN J·URISDICTIO'N OF SE,CO,ND CAUSE O~:B,
AO'TION.
By the las.t paragraph of the decree it looks like
the trial court believed it was maintaining jurisdiction
of the s·.econd cause. of action. On. the other hand it
would appear that the trial court would desire to have
the last say in this law suit ; for the decree provided
that if the plaintiff Geneve Graehl Burt should be deprived of the property in question then and .in that
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event the said trial court would grant her an intpr·est
in the estate of John A. Burt, deceased. Neither the
findings, conclusion nor the facts justify such a decree. It was ·a strong indirect persuasion put before
defendants that they should not a.p,peal this case. This
action of the court is a novel exp,erience to counsel in
the realm of appeals. The trial of this case was finished and complete when plaintiffs and defendants
rested. All the facts were in. S~ection 104-2·6-2 of the
Utah Code Ann. 1943 provides. that upon the trial the
"decision" of the Court "must he give·n in writing,
and filed with the clerk within thirty days after the
cause is submitted for decision.'' The decision in this
sense means a final determination so far as the trial
court is concerned. The defendants. take the position
that th~ trial court bas no further jurisdiction in this
matter once it is appealed. It has no power to call for
further proceedings unless the Sup~reme Court directs.

Errors Number 8 and 9:
THE CO~URT ERRED IN MAKING VALID DELIVERY O~F D·EED ONE OF ISS,UES AS WELL
AS INTEXT TO, VE,S.T TITLE.
The pre-trial was held five days before the case
was tried. Counsel for defendants at no time admitted
or conceded that one of the iss.ues in the case was the
valid delivery of the deed. The pre-trial statement in
at least one place and the comp~laint before the end of
the trial in at least three places admitted that after the
deed was signed it was surrendered or delivered to
John A. Burt,. the deceased, and in another place that
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Geneve Graehl Burt signed the deed conveying the property to said Burt. Even at the end of the trial after
th.e amendments to the complaint were made he plaintiffs admit in the last sentence of paragraph 6 of the
complaint that she did sign the deed and surrendered
it to him. So we think the court erred in making one
of the issue the valid delivery of the deed.
c·ounsel had no time to study the pre-trial statement ..At the- pre-trial we did generally agree as to a
very brief statement of facts taken from the pleadings.
We saw nothing in writing until the time the case was
called for trial. The so ealled ''disputed'' issues were
arbitrarily made by the cou.rt. Neither counsel had a
chance to <;heck it. The statements of facts is a very
brief statement of what is contained in the pleadings.
The disputed issue Number· 5 ''was the delivery of
Exhibit A for a special purpose only and without the
necessary· intent to vest title in grantee was a new
phase injected into the case. The complaint states the
grantee signed and surrendered the deed because of
grantee's persuasion and undue influence. Nothing is
found in the pleadings that grantor did not intend to
give him the title.

Error Number 10:

THE C0 URT ERRED IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY VARYING THE TERMS O,F' A WRITTEN
INSTRUMENT.
1

The questions and answers as copied in statement
of errors tells the story. The court refused to recognize defendants' objection to plaintiffs' question on
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direct examination of l\Irs. Geneve. Graehl Burt. Coun..
sel asked her if it was her intention to part with title.
The objection was made on the ground that it was attempting to Yary the tPrms of a \Yritten instrument. The
deed showed on its face what it \Yas. It was a deed
conY eying to grantee all of her interest. Now she wants
to tell the court she did not intend to part with all the
title but wanted it to operate only in case of her death.
In other words she wanted to reserve in herself a life
interest. The court permitting her to answer that question over the objection of defendants was in violation
of the well established rule that oral evidence will not
be permitted to vary the terms of a written instrument. This we think is reversable error.
Error Number 11:

THE CO~URT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLJ_jO·W IT:S O·WN RULING:
Objection was made to statements that were sup:posed to have been made by deceased, John A. Burt,
to plaintiff, Geneve Graehl Burt. After the statement
was in counsel for defendants moved it be stricken.
The court agreed to p~ay no attention to it. The findings indicate that he did p~ay some attention to that
testimony.
Er-rors Number 12 and 13:

THE CO~URT ER.RED IN FAILING TO MAKE
FINDINGS O~N ALL THE MATERIAL ISSUES.
I shall discuss errors 12 and 13 together. Both o:f
them are on the ground that the court did not make any
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findings, conclusions and judgment on the question of
laches and statute of limitations as presented in the
pleadings. This court has long held that no judginent
can properly be rendered until there is a finding on
all material issues. Thomas v. Farrell (Utah 1933)
26 P. 2d 328, 82 Utah .5·37. The question of limitation
and laches is very mate-rial in this case. The plaintiff
Geneve Graehl Burt executed and delivered the deed
to the deceased way back in 1941-more than seven
years before. the grantee died. If he coerced her, or
used his influence and domination on her to get her to
sign the instrument she knew it then. She did not have
to wait over seven years to find that out. If she had
any rights arising from that transaction she certainly
slept on them. If plain tiffs claim on the ground of
fraud the action was barred under s.ection 104-2-24
in three years. If they claim in equity then they are
barred within a reasonable time-and seven years is
far beyond a reasonable time in such a case. If they
claim under any other ground they are barred under
Section 104-2-30 in four years. Counsel may say, that
may apply to the first cause of action but what about
the second cause of action~ The grantor knew at all
times that the deceased had a legal wife and family
living and that his legal wife had her dower interest in
whatever real estate he acquired. Now if grantor any
time thought by her efforts she was entitled to 1/3,
or any other amount, of his property why did she wait
until after he was dead \vhen his mouth is closed to
make that claim~ We do not say that the second cause
of action gives. her any legal right of action-but if
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she had any legal right by any supposed claim of
partnership or joint ownership she cannot now after
grantee's death assert it 'vithout proof of some kind
of agreement bet"·een them. If there ever were any
such agreement in justice and equity she should have
asserted it while he 'vas alive.
Error f.lu.mber 14:

THE CONCLUSIONS O·F LAW AND JUDG~IEl\!Tf 0 F FIR•ST CAUS.E OF· ACTION ARE CO·NTRARY TO LAW.
1

They endeavor to void the deed and at the same
time allow plaintiff the property. I fail to s.ee ho'Y they
can do both. The plaintiff does not ask in the first
cause for any allowance of prop·erty. Such a conclusion
and decree are surplusage. It is also noted that conclusion (a) is based upon the finding that said plaintiff "did not intend to part with title'' and did not
deliver said deed to deceased.'' This is absolutely contrary to the .admitted facts in the comp~aint, in the
amended complaint and all of the surrounding circumstances of the case.
We have already called the court's attention to
the many p~a.ces in the original complaint where four
distinct admissions of delivery of the deed were made.
Even in the complaint as amended we have the following words of admission of delivery, taken from the
end of paragraph 6 :
- - - - ''John A. Burt stated to said plaintiff that because of the serious illness from whieh
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sibility that she would not recover it would be
better that she sign a deed ; that in reliance
thereon and under the direction and under the
influence and domination of said John A. Burt,
said plaintiff did sign the ·deed aforesaid - - - - - and did swrrender the said · deed to said
John A. Burt.''
That statement is susceptible of. only one meaning is
it not~ That is the deed was executed by her and delivered to him. If there were any question then it must
be construed most .strongly against the pleader-vol.
1 p. 635 Bancroft Code Pleading. In view of this admission and in view of the fact Mr.Burt had possession
of the deed and abstract at the time of his death the
defendants surely were under no burden to add further
testimony of delivery.
At no place in the complaint did plaintiffs allege
that said Geneve Gra.ehl Burt did not intend to part
with. title. There might he a weak inference, if the complaint were construed most strongly in plaintiffs' favor,
that she had confidence: and faith in him that he '\vould
let her live there as long as she lived. Is not this the
strongest inference in her favor you can draw from
that pleading~ If the deceased had made her any
promises to let her live there during her lifetime then
her action should be one to reform. the deed and not
to void an otherwise good deed. The action is not founded upon her lack of intention to part with title. In any
event we have her statement alone-and this was in
answer to a leading question whether or not she intended
to part with ti tie. The pleadings and the surrounding
circumstances belie her elaim in this respect.
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\Y. e think that in the beginning the property 'vas
held in trust by plaintiff Geneve Graehl Burt. She wa.s
merely getting the beneficial u·se out of it with the
consent of the deceased. It is not disputed that the de··
ceased purchased the property with his. own money.
It is not disputed that he, the deceased, furnished her
a place to live and for the most part supported her
all these years from about 1920. We must bear in
mind she was not his wife. So far as the law was concerned she was a stranger to him. When he bought
the property and caused it to be put in her name she
held it in trust for him and was entitled to request
her to deed it back to him at any time he wanted to.

In the case of Anderson v. Cercone (Ut. 1919) 180
P. 586, 54 Utah 345, the p·laintifrf and defendant had
been married and later divorced. Plaintiff during their
married life bought some real property and (as he
said "I considered she had some interest in it because
she was looking after the house and the children and
helping me what she could do") he caused it to be
put in her name (the defendant's). She later got a
divorce. Plaintiff sued to quiet the title. The court held
there was a resulting trust and that she held the property in trust for him since he p1aid for it.
The court quoted 39 Cyc. pp·. 118, 119 as follows:
''It is a well settled rule of equity, in the
absence of statutory provisions. otherwise, that
where property is paid for with money or assetA
of one person, and the title thereto is taken in
the name of another person, in the absence of
circumstances showing a different intention or
understanding a resulting trust in the property
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ar1ses in favor of the person whose money or
assets are so used, or persons claiming under
him, the controlling question being the ownership of the purchase money, and this is true,
although there is no actual intention on the part
of the party purchasing and taking the conveyance to hold the equitable title for the partv
whose funds are used in the p:urchas.e. '' . .,
This rule is practically universal the court said
except where changed by statute. Also s·ee Wheel .
wright vs. Roman (Utah 19'17) 165 P. 2d 513, 50 Utah
10, and Estey et al v. Haughian (Mont. 1941) 113 P.
325.
John A Burt exercised control and ownership over
the property. He frequented the place and worked on
it. He hired people .to work on it. He paid them. He
took charge of the place, hired his brother to do a lot
of the work. He irrigated it. When some person wanted
to buy a piece of the land he refused to sell. He did not
refer him to said plaintiff. He never did anything which
would lead one to believe that he did not claim ownership. Mrs. (teneve Graehl Burt said she stood none of
the expense. From this it could be reasonably inferred
that she did not pay the taxes but that ·the deceased
did.
In view of the circumstances of this case I am sure
the court would not say there was an inadequate consideration. Since no conclusion of la:w was made as to
whether or not there was adequate consideration this
is probably not before t.he court. Suf1fice to say, however, in the case of Estey et al v. Haughian (Mont.)
113 F'. 2d 325 above quoted the court held there was
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sufficient consideration where the grantee had furnished
part of the money for the purchase of the property
the title to "'"hich was put in the name of the grantor.
In that case the defendant and plajntiff had been living
together for years as if they were married, but in fact
were not married. Plaintiff Harriet Estey died and
her heirs brought suit against defendant to set aside
the deed given him by deceased. They declare the deed
was void for reason deceased was insane at time of
execution and on the further ground of undue influenee
on part of defendant, that it was withou.t consideration
and that deed was never delivered to defendant during
her lifetime.
The deed was not recorded until after the death
of grantor, seven years after it was executed. The
deed wa~ left in place where Mrs. E.stey, the deceased,
had access to it and where Hau:ghian .said she could
have it anytime she wanted it.
There was not ·sufficient evidence to prove grantor
was insane nor that there was undue influence.
As to consideration-defendant furnished $600.00
of the $1200.00 do-wn payment for the property. Then
he turned over his checks to grantor over a period of
years and from them monthly p~ayments were made on
the property in question. - - - - ''To say that the deed
was executed without consideration finds no support
in the record'' the court said.
The court held also there was sufficient delivery.
In 18 C. J. p. 162, Sec. 42 we find that the grantor
cannot deny. the -consideration stated. Further that in
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the absence of fraud as between the parties or their
heirs a deed is good without consideration. The defendants submit that the deed on its face is an absolute
conveyance of the fee and that there is not sufficient
evidence supported by any proper conclusions of law
to justify the judgment of the court in the first cause
of action.

As to Error Number 15:

THE CO~NCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND C'AUSE OF· ACTION ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW.
We have already said something about this in
other parts of this brief. We shall merely add this:
In the second cause the ·said plaintiff, Geneve Graehl
Burt, is trying to get part of the _inheritance which
rightfully, under the law, belongs to all the children
of the deceased and his legal wife, Luella H. Burt, one
of the defendants. It has long been the rule of law in
this state, as we understand, that ''a plural wife is
without the pale of the law of inheritance as to any
property which her husband had acquired (before marriage) or might thereafter acquire:" Raleigh v. Wells
(Utah 1905) 81 P. 908, 29 Utah 217.
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the
trial court on both causes of action should be reversed;
that both causes of action should be dismissed; that
defendants are entitled to their costs. herein and for
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such other relief ns to the court may seem proper In
the premises.
Respeetfully submitted,
GAYLEN S. YO,UNG,
Attorney for Defendants

and A pp~ellants
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